Disasters - Names		Disasters - Names

Date:	9th August 1925
Colliery:	Wallsend, Edward Pit
Cause:	Explosion
Lives Lost:	5

A serious explosion occurred on Sunday, 9th August, at 6.50 am., in the neighbourhood of an electrically-driven coal-cutting machine, in the 9th West District, Yard Seam, of the Edward Colliery, owned by the Wallsend and Hebburn Coal Co., Ltd., Northumberland. Four persons attending the machine — J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, and P. Banks — were killed as a result of shock and burns, and a fifth victim, J. T. Young, died from carbon monoxide poisoning, whilst attempting to travel outbye. One person received bodily injuries, one was seriously affected, and 26 others were slightly affected (most of whom were rescuers), by after-damp. The Yard Seam was from 2ft. 8in. to 3 ft. in thickness and was opened out about eight years ago by the long-wall method of working. Electrical coal-cutting machines were introduced in the early part of 1924. At the time of the explosion there were three electric chain machines in use in the Yard Seam (Plate 2), all of them being in the 9th West District, the only district working in this seam. The explosion occurred at No. 1 machine (Plates 1 and 2), to the right of the second south mothergate and in the last working place in the ventilating current, and at the highest point in the working face. These workings were the furthest inbye from the downcast shaft, the distance therefrom being about 650 yds.

There were two small faults in the district, and No. 1 machine was opening out a face on the rise side of the last one proved. The ninth west engine plane (Plate 2) was the intake, and the second south mothergate the return, and these were only separated by a single brattice sheet in the short roadway, about 8 yds. in length, between the main intake and main return. There was no airway through the fault to the right of No. 1 machine. No air measurements had been taken in the intake airway for this district, the last reading recorded by the master wasteman being 3,369 cub. ft. per minute at a regulator (not shown on plan) in the return airway 1,150 yds. outbye from this machine, along a tortuous road. Electric safety lamps were in general use at the colliery and each leading machineman also carried a flame safety lamp.

No persons were employed in the mine on Saturday, 8th August, after 1 p.m., but at midnight a shift of men descended to clear cut coal in front of the machines and to prepare the face. This shift was made up of some deputies acting as coal fillers and others, but no inspection was made of the district before work commenced, the men going direct to the working face in contravention of Sections 63 and 64 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911.

An overman descended at 4 a.m. on Sunday morning, 9th August, to see that the faces were clear for the coal-cutting machine men who followed at 6 a.m. This official admitted at the inquest that he only travelled to the front of No. 1 machine, and did not make any inspection of the face to the right of the machine and towards the fault. After leaving this machine, he lost the light in his oil flame lamp between the face of the second south mothergate and No. 4 machine, and shortly afterwards lost another light which he had procured, and proceeded to complete his inspection with an electric lamp, which was useless for gas detection. Men who had been at work from midnight to 6 a.m. between Nos. 1 and 4 machines, were all using electric lamps; they say they noticed nothing unusual in the atmosphere and heard no falls of roof. No unusual conditions as to roof weighting or disturbance of the ventilating system could be traced prior to the explosion in fact, the roof in the neighbourhood of No. 1 machine was standing a fortnight after the explosion.

The 6 o'clock shift comprised 23 persons, including three sets of machine men. On the way inbye, Coxon, who was to work No. 1 machine, told Lauder, who was to have charge of No. 4 machine, that he had knocked out his oil flame lamp, and there is no evidence of this lamp having been re-lighted. The last person to see the four machinemen alive was a driller named Mayne, who was drilling a hole in a canch in the first gateway to the left of the second south mothergate. About 15 to 20 minutes before the explosion he went to the No. 1 machine to get assistance to remove a full tub, and saw the machine then running with the jib in its working position, and Coxon using a pick to kirve between the jib and bottom coal. Mayne's description of the condition of No. 1 machine face was that "it was pretty warm." After receiving assistance in removing the tub he commenced drilling and shortly afterwards he felt a rush of hot air and dust from the direction of No. I machine, and without cutting off the air from his drill, he made his way outbye and was later rescued in the second south mothergate by a machine man named Turner. The No. 2 machine (Plate 2) was in charge of Turner, who says that at about 12 minutes to 7 o'clock he noticed a rush of air, and thought it was due to a big fall of roof, and on going out to the landing he found the main separation sheet between intake and return on the ninth west engine plane blown down and also noticed a smell of burning. He had all the switches for the coal cutter circuits opened and ran to the shaft to telephone the lamp man on the surface to the effect that "something had happened in the ninth west district" ; the time then would be about 7.20 a.m.

Subsequent investigation showed very little evidence of violence or burning throughout the district, but there was evidence of coking on timbers, and there were small falls of roof on the mothergate as shown on Plate 1. A fall occurred on the face between the second south mothergate and the first left on Sunday night, and as firedamp was present, which could not be cleared by the available ventilation, the machine and flexible cable were taken to the surface for examination on the following Wednesday. The findings of the investigation of the electrical plant are fully discussed in the Annual Report of Mr. J. A. B. Horsley, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines, and indicate the probability that the explosion was initiated by electric arcing or sparking between the current carrying parts of the plug connector, and the corresponding radiused edges of the contact tubes with which they engage to complete the electrical circuit between the machine and the trailing cable. As this electrical burning on the pins and tubes was at their outer extremities, it could only have been brought about in the act of inserting or withdrawing the plug while the circuit was otherwise complete between the source of supply and the coal cutting machine motor. In this connection it is very significant that Coxon's body was found with an India-rubber glove on the right hand and the other glove grasped in the left hand; also that undoubted signs of exactly similar burnings were found on two other trailing cable plugs examined on the surface. This points to the conclusion that the plug connector had been used to make or to break the circuit while the controlling switch on the machine was switched "on" and while the electrical pressure was on the trailing cable.

Mr. C. A. Nelson, who first examined the No. 1 machine after the explosion, found the jib racked clear of the coal ; the haulage rope laid out preparatory to turning the machine the plug inserted in the socket of the machine with the hinged bolts which are provided to secure the plug in position, and the controlling switch on the machine in the neutral position.

Samples of dust were taken by the Inspectors of Mines after the explosion, within 5 yds. radius of each of the machines, and also samples from the roof, sides and floor over a length of 50 yds. in each adjacent roadway, which showed on analysis that the combustible matter in the dust at the face was slightly over 50 per cent., but that in the roadways it was well within the required standard.

The possible sources of ignition were flame safety lamps, matches, abrasive sparking of the cutter picks, and electricity. In the entire absence of other evidence the investigation of this explosion points to the conclusions that an accumulation of firedamp was ignited, probably by electrical arcing at the plug connector on No. 1 machine; that the limitations were fixed by the volume of the explosive atmosphere, and that coal dust took practically no part in the explosion.

In discussing this accident, it is difficult to understand how longwall workings could drift into the state shown by a glance at Plate 2, if proper supervision had been exercised by the management. It will be seen that a longwall face, about 550 yds. in length, on which three electrical coal-cutting machines were at work, depended for its ventilation on a single brattice sheet at the bottom of the second south mothergate, across a short roadway about 8 yds. in length, between the main intake and return airway, along which pony putters and men were continually passing during the working day. With the open cross-cuts to the left of the mothergate it appears obvious that very little air would traverse the working face, and that practically none would reach the of No. 1 machine. It will be seen from Plate 2 that the return airway was very tortuous and upon examination was found to be rough and in some places of very restricted cross-sectional area. With the district in this condition and in a seam which gave off firedamp, it is not difficult to account for gas accumulating in the neighbourhood of the second south mothergate and No. 1 machine.

An air measurement taken in the ninth west engine plane five days after the explosion, showed that all the air then entering the district was 3,217 cub. ft. per minute. In the second south mothergate, 26 yds. from the last working place, the quantity was found to be approximately 215 cub. ft. per minute, whilst at the regulator in the main return the measurement was 5,868 cub. ft. per minute. When it is remembered that this latter measurement shows an increased volume for the seam of 74 per cent. over the measurement made prior to the explosion, and given previously, no comment is necessary as to the ventilation in the neighbourhood of No. 1 machine at the time of the explosion. The ventilation was increased after the accident by cutting off the air from other districts and opening the Yard Seam regulator and, even with this addition, and further assisted by compressed air, it took nearly seven hours to clear the afterdamp from the second south mothergate, which is only about 200 yds. in length.

As previously stated, no inspection of the district was made before the midnight shift commenced work. Later, the overman failed to make an inspection of the face between No. 1 machine and the fault and, indeed, it is doubtful if he made an examination for firedamp anywhere in the district. There seems little doubt that he lost his light on the two occasions previously mentioned, due to the presence of firedamp. It can be stated without hesitation that the laxity of the officials in neglecting to make proper inspections and tests for firedamp was the primary cause of the disaster. The investigation also showed that no effective use was made of the flame lamps supplied to the machinemen, who, in any case, had very vague ideas as to where to make tests for firedamp. It was generally admitted that the flame lamp was hung at the gate-end switch on arrival at the commencement of the shift, and allowed to remain there.

The rescue work was carried on courageously by the personal efforts of the workmen and officials and all persons who took part deserve unstinted praise. It is, however, necessary to point out that the Central Rescue Station was not notified until more than two hours after the explosion, and even after this loss of valuable time there was complete lack of direction on the part of the management, with the result that effective work by the rescue brigades did not commence at the advanced base until 11.15 a.m., nearly 4½ hours after the explosion occurred. A superior official of the mine should be appointed to take charge of the advanced base to receive reports, collect information from survivors and rescuers, and organise the rescue work, and such an official would have been invaluable in this case. It was also unfortunate that there were no trained local men available to act as guides to the rescue teams. Five rescue teams in all took part in the recovery of the bodies, and the reports of the leaders show that they were keen and accurate observers under difficult conditions, pointing to efficient training.

The importance of organisation of rescue work cannot be over-emphasised. On this occasion it was about 2.30 p.m., or 7 hours and 40 minutes before the last body was brought to the base, and the loss of time would have been particularly serious if it could have been shown that the men had lived an appreciable period after the occurrence. Using the time periods actually taken by the rescue brigades on different phases of work, and assuming that the Central Rescue Station was notified half an hour after the explosion, the first body could have been brought out to the base two hours after the occurrence, and the remaining three bodies in the next hour, employing four rescue teams in the work.

It should also be borne in mind that numbers of rescuers unnecessarily risked their lives, and in several cases had themselves to be rescued.

Attention should be drawn to the very remarkable similarity between this explosion and the explosion which occurred at Hartley Bank Colliery, Netherton, Yorkshire, on 23rd May, 1924. The report* on the Hartley Bank explosion by H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines, contains recommendations for the prevention of accidents of this character. The Agent and Manager of the Edward pit, both admitted they had not read the report. It would therefore appear to be opportune to direct attention to that report and to the concluding general remarks in it.

By your direction, proceedings were instituted against the agent and manager, alleging a large number of breaches of the Mines Act or General Regulations. The agent was fined £40 and ordered to pay £14 4s. 4d. in costs, and the manager was fined £50 and ordered to pay £ 14 16s. 4d. in costs. For statistical purposes — the cases having been heard during 1926 — details of the informations laid and of the verdict will be given in Section IV of my next report.

* Report on the causes of and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Hartley Bank Colliery, Netherton, Yorkshire, on 23rd May, 1924, by Henry Walker, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines. (Cmd. 2364.)

	Banks, Peter, at 6.50a.m.on Sunday 9th August 1925 an explosion occurred in the 9th West District of the Yard Seam of the Edward Colliery owned by Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Co. near to where an electrically driven coal-cutting machine was at work, the four miners attending the machine [J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, P. Banks] were killed by shock and burns and J. T. Young died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the outbye
	Coxon, Joseph, at 6.50a.m.on Sunday 9th August 1925 an explosion occurred in the 9th West District of the Yard Seam of the Edward Colliery owned by Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Co. near to where an electrically driven coal-cutting machine was at work, the four miners attending the machine [J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, P. Banks] were killed by shock and burns and J. T. Young died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the outbye
	Hogg, Reginald, at 6.50a.m.on Sunday 9th August 1925 an explosion occurred in the 9th West District of the Yard Seam of the Edward Colliery owned by Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Co. near to where an electrically driven coal-cutting machine was at work, the four miners attending the machine [J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, P. Banks] were killed by shock and burns and J. T. Young died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the outbye
	Matthews, Francis, at 6.50a.m.on Sunday 9th August 1925 an explosion occurred in the 9th West District of the Yard Seam of the Edward Colliery owned by Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Co. near to where an electrically driven coal-cutting machine was at work, the four miners attending the machine [J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, P. Banks] were killed by shock and burns and J. T. Young died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the outbye
	Young, John George, at 6.50a.m.on Sunday 9th August 1925 an explosion occurred in the 9th West District of the Yard Seam of the Edward Colliery owned by Wallsend & Hebburn Coal Co. near to where an electrically driven coal-cutting machine was at work, the four miners attending the machine [J. Coxon, R. Hogg, F. Matthews, P. Banks] were killed by shock and burns and J. T. Young died from carbon monoxide poisoning in the outbye
	All names found

17 Mar 1926

Wallsend Pit Explosion, Two Colliery Officials Charged (The Times)

 

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