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Explosions of firedamp — From this cause thirteen lives were lost during the year 1916, as the result of one accident ; and there can be no doubt that this loss would not have occurred if the officials concerned had made a proper examination before commencing work. Had they done so they would have discovered the presence of inflammable gas, or would have noticed that there was not a ventilating current sufficient to carry away any firedamp that might be given off. The explosion referred to occurred on Sunday morning, the 13th August, in the Main Seam at Woodhorn Colliery, one of the Ashington group of mines in Northumberland, when a repairing shift was in the mine for the purpose of setting steel girders as roof supports. As the work was of a special nature the shift was composed of eight deputies and five other persons sent in to assist them. The shafts at this colliery are sunk to the Low Main Seam, and, in descending order pass through the High Main Seam which was not being worked ; the Main Seam, then the Yard Seam, which were being worked as naked light Yard and the Low Main Seams are extensively worked; nothing but headings were, driven into the High Main, and two pairs of headings were being driven into the Main Coal east and west at either side of a cross-measure drift which intersects all the seams, for the purpose of opening out workings in. this seam. The Main Seam was ventilated by fresh air entering the top of the drift from the High Main Seam and returning down the drift, to the shaft at the Low Main Seam. On this date the men received their instructions in the Low Main Seam. at 6 a.m. from the master-shifter, and then proceeded up the drift to the Main Coal. About half an hour after the men had left the master-shifter, he was aware that something had happened, and he and others went up the drift. They found two men alive but unconscious (and they never recovered consciousness) in the drift below the Main Seam workings; the other eleven men had been killed outright by the explosion. After very careful enquiry and investigation, I came to conclusion that the explosion originated through an accumulation of firedamp being ignited by a naked light near the face of the main west heading. The force appeared to have travelled outbye, into each opening right and left; then across the drift into the east levels. At the face of the main east heading it is almost certain that another accumulation of firedamp was met with, and the renewed force then travelled outbye — carrying away in its path all the supports to the girders which had not been removed by the first inrush — until it met the afterdamp coming from the west levels, and was then choked down. The evidence leading to these conclusions is as follows :— The coal is thick, so that the roadways were about 8 feet in height, and the main headings 12 feet in width. These headings were ordinarily ventilated by compressed air arranged in such a manner that a jet of compressed air played into the open end of a 6-inch pipe and induced a current of air which was carried forward from the end of the last stenton. On the date in question the air compressor was not at work (it was regularly stopped every other week-end from 5 a .m. on Saturday to 6 a.m. on Sunday), and further owing to shortness of steam, due to the fact that four stokers had failed to attend their work, the ventilating fan was running at a slower speed than usual. The compressed air being off, there would be no current of air passing into each heading beyond the last stenton ; that is, for a length of 58 yards on the east heading and 93 yards on the west heading. On the previous day, too, the fan had been off for repairs for six hours, and a furnace which would not give the same amount of ventilation had been lighted in its stead. It is interesting to note also, though we have it upon high scientific authority that a change of pressure will not effect the exudation of gas from solid coal, that for the week ending the 13th August the barometer had steadily fallen .75 of an inch. Gas had never been seen in this seam and, therefore, it is likely that none of the eight officials made a very close search for it. I think it is certain that these officials never raised their lamps as high as their heads. As a partly consumed candle was found near a full tub a few yards from the face of the main west heading, and the bodies of two men a little outbye of the tub, lying against a girder with their necks broken, I assume that one of the two men had probably stood upon the tub while making preparations for setting a steel girder, and had ignited a layer of firedamp lying next to the roof. There were little signs of either heat or force at this point. Outbye of this there had been great heat and it is probable that near here detonation was set up. Further outbye a man had been violently blown along a stenton from the direction of the main level to the back level, and was much burnt. Still further outbye there was a fall of roof, the girders being displaced outbye. At the end of the main level next to the drift a number of full tubs were jammed close together, and the one nearest to the drift was upended in an outbye direction. At the drift end of the back west level a girder was displaced out bye. At the drift end of the main east level a man and a pony were badly burnt, then covered by a fall of roof. Some yards from the face of the main east heading the bodies of four men were found showing signs of very severe burning and force. About this point there had been very intense heat. I feel convinced that this heat was due not to compression only but to compression of an explosive mixture. Had the explosion originated in this heading, as was suggested at the Coroner's Inquest by a well-known Mining Engineer, the evidences of force along the west heading should have pointed in an opposite direction, and signs of heat should have been visible near the face. The roof of these main levels was supported by 12-feet girders, some 2 feet apart, resting upon running timbers each of which carried four girders, and a prop upon a footing was set beneath each girder. Along the east heading a fall, 4 feet in thickness and for a length of 90 yards, had taken place. The same witness offered the opinion that the fall of roof came away so suddenly that the air displaced by it had sufficient force to throw men to the ground and break their necks, also that the fall either liberated gas or was helped down by the pressure of gas behind it, and the gas ultimately became ignited. The area of the fall is bounded by a depression in the seam due to the goaf in the coal workings beneath. Such conditions are most suitable for shaking the strata and steadily liberating any gas that may exist, and also loosening the supports to the roof. It is a fact, however, that no gas had been seen in the cavities in the roof, neither before nor since the explosion. It is somewhat difficult to appreciate how it can be suggested, in a roadway such as I have described, that shale is going to descend like a piston in a cylinder, with such awkward obstacles in its way as all these footings, props, runners and long girders. Prior to the explosion gas had never been seen in the mine. After the explosion it was seen at the face of the headings in both sets of levels, and at a time when the barometer had been falling for a week. On the 25th August when the barometer had again been steadily falling for some four days, and, moreover, when the normal quantity of air had been doubled, gas was seen again at the face of the headings, but was not discovered in any cavities of the roof outbye of the faces. It is a reasonable assumption, therefore, that on the date of the explosion firedamp had accumulated at the face of the headings. Naked lights were used in this seam, and although both safety lamps and candles were found near the men who lost their lives it was only because all the men concerned usually worked in the Low Main Seam that they had safety lamps in their possession. The floor of the roadways was damp, but probably there was an amount of dry coal dust upon the flanges of the girders, sufficient to play some part in the explosion. The investigation of the cause of the accident disclosed the following violations of the Coal Mines Act, 1911 :— (1) Section 29 (1). An adequate amount of ventilation was not constantly produced to dilute or render harmless inflammable gas. (2) Section 64 (1) (3). The deputy or deputies did not ascertain the condition of the mine so far as the presence of gas and ventilation were concerned, nor was a report of the inspection recorded in a book kept for the purpose. Legal proceedings which were instituted against the manager and engine-wright were dismissed by the Justices, but their decision — so far as concerned the manager — is now under appeal, and the result will be given in my report for the current year. The inquest on the bodies of the men killed by the explosion was held before Coroner Percy at Ashington, on the 12th, 13th and 21st September. The Jury returned the following verdict :— "That the deceased men were accidentally killed on the 13th day of August, 1916, while working in Woodhorn Colliery, by an explosion of gas in the Main Seam, and that such gas had accumulated through want of sufficient ventilation, and exploded through contact with a naked light and before any fall of stone took place. The Jury are of opinion that the management should see in future that written reports should be made for every shift, special or otherwise. The Jury are also of opinion that there has been a certain amount of laxity on the part of the management for not seeing that sufficient ventilation was being maintained." With regard to the inadequate amount of ventilation, it seems extraordinary that none of those concerned should have been aware that the compressed air was not on. Even had the air been on I am of opinion that as the air pipes were upon the floor of the roadways and a distance from the faces, the air current would not have been sufficient to dilute the gas which came off. The management appear to have had an objection to the use of ordinary brattice on the ground that it might be destroyed by shot-firing. This was by no means an insuperable difficulty. The whole of the ventilation entering this seam had to pass through a regulator in the High Main Seam. That regulator could have been opened if necessary to allow a very large quantity of air to pass into these few workings, and with the use of ordinary bratticing the faces could have been swept clean of firedamp. With regard to inspection, several deputies gave evidence that on Sunday morning shifts two of their number always made an inspection. They always looked upon these shifts as special, and as they were composed of officials (though in this case five others had joined them) it was unnecessary to make written reports. I found that this was an understanding common to the county, and I learned later that it was also accepted as the proper procedure throughout Durham. This, of course, was altered in both counties to conform to the strict requirements of the Act.
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