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An explosion of firedamp occurred at Ushaw Moor Colliery, Durham, at about 5.40 a.m. on 14th November, in the No. 6 West Gate, Straight North District, Victoria Seam, causing the death of two persons. The seam, 20 inches thick, with a blue shale roof, was won by a pair of cross-measure drifts from the Brockwell Seam. In the Straight North District, approximately one mile from the shaft, the main winnings, intake and return airways, were driven in the solid coal, and pillars were being formed on either side preparatory to developing single-stall workings. Safety lamps were in use throughout the mine. The haulage hands were provided with electric lamps, and the other workmen with flame lamps, the majority of which were of the sliding-band type with lead-rivet locks. Permitted explosives were used but shots were fired only in bottom canches, the holes being drilled by compressed air. The No. 6 West Gate had been turned away off the intake airway and driven six yards wide in the solid coal for a distance of 45 yards, the roadway being carried 4 ft. 6 ins, wide along the right coal side and made four feet high by taking up a bottom canch 2 ft. 6 ins, thick. A pack 12 feet wide had been built on the left side of the roadway and between this pack and the left coal side an airway was maintained from the intake airway to the face of the gate. The airway between the pack and the coal was approximately two feet square, but this area was slightly reduced at a point where it passed through a two-feet dip hitch about 19 yards from the face. No shots had been fired in the gate on the day of the accident. Referring to Figure 4 it will be seen that the Straight North District, comprising the 3rd, 4th and 5th West, and the North and 4th East Flats, was ventilated by one air current. According to the Company's records of air measurements taken on 25th October, 1932, the quantity of air passing in the main intake airway at the top of Shaw's Drift from the Brockwell to the Victoria Seam was 6,384 cubic feet per minute, and the quantity in the intake airway 100 yards from the face of the first working place was 1,630 cubic feet per minute. These figures indicate a loss of 4,754 cubic feet per minute in approximately 620 yards. At 3.25 a.m. on the day of the accident, deputy Thomas Mahan completed an inspection of his district, the 5th West, North, and East flats, and reported it free from inflammable gas. At 3.45 a.m. the hewers reached the North meeting station and, as their lamps had been examined by another deputy at the 3rd West meeting station further outbye, Mahan sent them into their working places. William Timmons, a hewer, was sent to No. 6 West gate with instructions to clear a small fall about 15 to 20 yards from the entrance. At 5.30 a.m. Joseph Coulthard, a putter, took a tub into the No. 6 West gate, and found Timmons at the face. Coulthard thought the air was bad, and mentioned it to Timmons, who replied that he had turned on the compressed air. The delivery end of a flexible hose attached to a one-inch compressed air range (supplying power to a drilling machine), was, according to Coulthard's statement, lying in the gate about eight feet from the face. Coulthard then returned to his working place about 30 yards inbye from No. 6 gate. Shortly afterwards another putter, Arthur Gill, called at Coulthard's working place and said he was going into No. 6 gate to fetch a drilling machine. A few minutes later the explosion occurred. Coulthard stated that he heard a loud report and felt a gust of wind which extinguished his lamp. Deputy Mahan was at once informed. He withdraw all the men on the return side and then, after sending a message to the Manager and Undermanager, went to No. 6 gate. With the help of others he managed to recover the body of Arthur Gill which was found some 20 yards up the gate, but owing to the state of the atmosphere, the recovery of the second body, Timmons, was left to the Crook rescue brigade which had been summoned at 6.50 a.m. The body was found a few yards further inbye shortly after 8 a.m. The rescue brigade also recovered the top part of one safety lamp — 419 — and the oil vessel of another — 743 — which were lying close together immediately inbye of Timmons' body. About six hours after the explosion I made an inspection accompanied by Mr. H. S. Scott, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines. The scaling sheet between the airway and entrance of No. 6 gate was completely closed, to allow the whole of the ventilation to be deflected along the airway to the face of the gate. Half an hour afterwards, no firedamp could be detected in the gate with the exception of about 1¼ per cent, in a small cavity in the roof at the two-feet hitch. Prior to the explosion, firedamp had not been recorded anywhere in the district with the exception of two per cent. in No. 3 West Gate on 15th September, 1932. The explosion was confined almost entirely to the No. 6 gate, and possibly ten yards inbye, as charred paper was found at that point. With the exception of three or four small falls and a few displaced supports there was little evidence of violence. There were signs of coking on the timber near the face and on the front end of a tub some seven yards from the face. The upper part of lamp 743 and the oil vessel of lamp 419 were found close together about 26 yards from the entrance to No. 6 West gate and near the two-feet hitch. This was close to the place where, earlier in the morning, the upper part of lamp 419 and the oil vessel of lamp 743 had been recovered by the rescue brigade. There were no signs of the lead rivets in the locking devices of the lamps, nor could they be found. Lamps 743 and 419 belonged to Timmons and Gill respectively. So far as could be seen by external examination the lamps were undamaged, but they were impounded and forwarded to the Mines Department Testing Station for test. It was then found that the oil vessel of lamp 743 was so worn that when locked it could be completely unscrewed without interfering with the lead rivet. The oil vessel of lamp 419 could be partially unscrewed. The outer gauze of the latter lamp was defective in that its flange base ring was insecurely attached to the gauze and the inner lining ring was missing. Properly assembled and locked the lamps were found to be safe when placed in an explosive mixture of firedamp and air. As a result of the investigations, I arrived at the following conclusions, namely that (1) The explosion was almost entirely one of firedamp and air. (2) The firedamp had been given off from the hitch leader in the No. 6 West Gate. (3) The explosive mixture was ignited by the flame of an open light. (4) One or both of the deceased men removed the lead-rivet locks and opened the lamps for the purpose of relighting one of them — contraventions of Section 34 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. (5) The quantity of air provided in the No. 6 West Gate was inadequate to dilute and render harmless the accumulation of gas.
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