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  Disasters - Names Disasters - Names  
Date:  25th September 1929
Colliery:  Rising Sun, Northumberland
Cause:  Explosion caused by shot firing
Lives Lost:  2

Description

An ignition of firedamp caused by shotfiring occurred at Rising Sun Colliery, Northumberland, (Wallsend and Hebburn Coal Co. Ltd.) on the 30th March at 2.15 p.m. in the C.5 District of the Yard Seam, fortunately without injury to anyone.

This accident is included on page 44 under Dangerous Occurrences and is described here as being in some respects similar to the accident mentioned above, and also to the one following.

Three shots were fired one after the other in a canch lip near the coal face, Saxonite being used with a No. 6 high tension detonator placed in the inbye end of the inner cartridge. A small quantity of gas was ignited by the second shot and was seen burning with a bluish flame a foot deep near the roof for a short time, and then die out.

Investigation following the occurrence again showed that no proper examination for firedamp had been made before firing the second shot, and that the holes had not been properly tested for breaks.

Another explosion of firedamp occurred about 12.30 a.m. on the 25th September at the same colliery involving the deaths of two persons and injuries to six others. The accident happened in the C. 11 District working the Yard Seam.

Fig. 2 is an enlarged plan of the workings affected by the explosion, and Fig. 3 is a key plan showing the general lay out of the district.

The seam was about 3ft. 2ins. thick with a moderately strong blue metal roof for about 1ft. 9ins., then a softer blue metal above.

The district had about 30 working places laid out on the ordinary longwall method with gateways 11 yards apart and two deputies on each shift had charge of it.

The canches in the roadways were usually shot down with Saxonite fired by No, 6 high tension detonators.

Firedamp had not been reported anywhere in the district by the deputies at 11 p.m. on the night of the 24th September — about 2½ hours before the explosion. About 12 hours after the accident, gas at explosive point was found by H.M. Inspectors at the face of the North Mothergate and in the canches of the 3rd. 4th, 5th and 6th places to the left, or west, of the North Mothergate. At the time of the explosion there were between 30 and 40 workmen in the district.

At about midnight on the 24th September, William Blenkinsopp the deputy for the part of the district in which the explosion occurred, arrived at the face of the mothergate and found two stonemen, Curry and Askwith, at work there. Three shot holes had been drilled on the day shift, one in the centre of the canch and about half way up, and one at each side near the roof, as shown in the plan and section (Fig. 4). The centre shot was designed to break the strong blue bed and the other holes to blow down the weaker portions and trim off the sides. Each hole was said to be about 4ft. 6ins. deep.

Curry, in giving evidence at the Coroner's Court said:

"About midnight Blenkinsopp came in and asked if we were ready for firing. I said we were and told him I had found a small trace of gas. He replied, ‘ Oh, it's nothing.' I then went for a drink and when I came back he said, 'I can't find any trace of gas.' "

Blenkinsopp then appears to have charged all the holes with Saxonite explosive using in the centre hole 9 ounces, the left hole 10 ounces and the right one 8 ounces, with clay stemming in each to within about a foot of the mouth of the hole. He said he then examined all places within a radius of 20 yards for gas and fired the centre hole after taking refuge with Curry and Askwith on the North Mothergate outbye a canvas sheet in a direct line with the shot. After waiting a few minutes to allow the smoke to clear, he said he returned to the face and attached the battery leads to the right hand shot and, after examining in the canch only for gas, he fired that shot. It appears to have given disappointing results and dislodged very little ground.

The evidence as to Blenkinsopp's examination for gas before firing the 3rd shot is conflicting; he said he made the examination required. Curry when giving evidence before the Coroner said that Blenkinsopp was away from Askwith and himself for not more than 3 or 4 minutes. A proper examination as required by the Explosives in Coal Mines Order would probably have taken 10 to 15 minutes.

After firing the 3rd shot, Blenkinsopp stated that he was in the act of rolling up his cable when he heard a loud noise and saw a flash. All three men on the North Mothergate were burned, also one (Fox) who was working in the 1st right place, together with the three men working to the left — viz. Akenhead, Reeves and Sproates. Akenhead and Reeves subsequently succumbed to their injuries. Another man suffered very slight injuries and shock but it was not clear where he was at the time of the explosion.

Evidence of flame in the form of coked coal dust, melted resin on props, charred paper and the like, could be detected along the face 22 yards to the right and 50 yards to the left of the North Mothergate. The flame reached a point at least 40 yards outbye from the face on the North Mothergate where Blenkinsopp and the stonemen were taking refuge. Beyond these points evidence of burning could not be traced.

From an inspection of the canch after the accident it appeared that the first shot had done its work properly but the right hand one had not dislodged much ground, the detonator wires being still fast in the hole and a stemming stick could be pushed in about 3ft. 6ins. When the ground surrounding the shothole was taken down with a pick, the back of the hole was found to be enlarged and it looked as if the explosive had spent itself in a bedding plane, consequently doing very little useful work.

The indications at the left hole pointed to it having been bored on a wrong angle; instead of being directed towards the side of the roadway, it terminated about 3ft. from the side. This brought it nearly over where the centre hole had been and gave it little work to do.

The ground had sagged on the left side leaving a cavity of 1½ins. between the sagged portion and the roof. A blower of gas was issuing from this cavity.

No stonedust had been applied in the North Mothergate before shotfiring; the last trace was found 29 yards back from the face. Blenkinsopp admitted at the inquest that he had not applied stone dust before firing, and that the only examination made for breaks in the shotholes was by means of his wooden stemming rod. He stated he lost his scraper a few nights before the accident and had not had it replaced.

The roads to within a short distance of the face were damp underfoot.

The quantity of air circulating as recorded in the air measurement book dated the 23rd September, was 4,210 cubic feet per minute at a point 100 yards from the first working place at which the air entered. The intake airway to the district was restricted measuring at certain points only 4ft. by 3ft.

On the day following the explosion, the ventilation was insufficient to clear accumulations of gas although new sheets had been erected, and the blower at the point of ignition was not cleared for some days.

After carefully considering all the circumstances, I have come to the following conclusions:

(1) That the second shot spent itself in a bedding plane and liberated a blower of gas;

(2) That Blenkinsopp did not test the canch properly for gas between the second and third shots;

(3) That an explosive mixture was present when the third shot was fired;

(4) That the third shot was badly placed and overcharged; and

(5) That the flame from the shot ignited the gas and caused the explosion.

I would again call attention to the vital necessity of strictly complying with the requirements of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order and the careful placing of shotholes. I am strongly of opinion that where a number of shots have to be fired in close proximity to each other the practice of charging more than onehole at a time is a grave danger in collieries where firedamp is given off. It is a practice which should not be tolerated in safety lamp mines. The amount of explosive required for a second shot cannot be estimated until the first shot has been fired, and the amount for a third until the second has been fired, and so on. If all are charged at one time serious risks of having badly placed and overcharged holes must arise.

Source: 1929 Mines Inspectors Report

Fatalities

  

Akenhead, Robert, explosion of firedamp

  

Reeves, Robert, explosion of firedamp

 
All names found

 

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