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| Date: | 23rd November 1928 |
| Colliery: | Backworth, Eccles |
| Cause: | Explosion of firedamp |
| Lives Lost: | 4 |
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| Description | |
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An explosion of firedamp occurred at about 2 p.m. on 23rd November, at the Backworth "Eccles" Colliery, Northumberland, involving the deaths of four persons and slight injuries to seven others. The accident occurred at a top canch near the face of No. 22 tailgate, which was the timber road to the "D" conveyor face, and the intake airway for the Fifth West District of the Beaumont Seam. The layout of the workings is shown in Plate I.
The district where the accident occurred is situated about 1½ miles from the shaft and consists of two longwall double conveyor units, each comprising two 90 yard conveyors delivering to central gate-end loaders. The coal was 2ft. 6in. thick with a blue shale roof, and was undercut to a depth of 4ft. 6in. in the fireclay floor. Approved flame safety lamps were in use; the conveyors and coal-cutting machines were electrically operated.
Coal filling ceased on "C" and "D" faces on the previous shift, and prior to the accident the deputy (Samuel Bell, deceased) in charge of these faces and roadways leading thereto — which comprised the whole of his district — is presumed to have made a complete inspection and found no gas. When the workmen arrived at the "station" on No. 19 heading, two stonemen were sent to the face of No. 22 gateway with instructions to bore a shothole in the top canch. The canch was 5ft. thick and 10ft, wide, and had reached a point 19ft. from the coal face.
The only survivor in the area swept by the explosion was one of the stonemen referred to (Samuel William Durrant), and he stated that when they arrived at the face the other stoneman (Hutton) removed a brattice hurdle sheet which was hanging about 3ft. outside the ripping canch and commenced to bore the hole, whilst he set breaking-off timbers at the roadside underneath the canch, and withdrew the supports between, ready for firing. The shothole was placed in the left side of the canch, about 1ft. 2in. from the roof, and was 4ft. 6in. deep.
No explanation was forthcoming as to who placed this brattice hurdle sheet in the roadway, and the only suggestion given was that it was apparently fixed to divert air into the "fast" or right hand side cut.
During the progress of boring the hole Durrant says that he thought (judging from a smell near the roof) that firedamp was present; he says he informed the deputy of this when the latter arrived, but in spite of the information the deputy appears to have charged and stemmed the hole, using (according to the records of the explosive issued and returned) 16 oz. of No. 3 Samsonite in 4 oz. cartridges. Durrant stated at the inquest that he saw Bell put 18 oz. of explosive into the hole, and that the detonator was put in the centre. The deputy then appeared to have made an examination for inflammable gas in and around the shothole, the stonemen having gone outbye along the No. 22 gateway for about 30 yards. Shortly afterwards the deputy came out and informed them that he was unable to fire the shot as he had found inflammable gas present. He then left and went outbye, presumably to tighten up the brattice sheet on the No. 19 cross heading some 300 yards away. He returned to the stonemen about half an hour later and asked them if they thought there was more air coming into the roadway, and after receiving a reply in the affirmative he went to the canch, shouted a warning to some men on the face that he was going to fire, and after reaching his battery 23 yards outbye fired the shot.
Immediately after the firing of the shot a blast of air and flame travelled outbye along the tailgate and down the coal face, with the result that the three men on the tailgate and two others 12 and 40 yards respectively down the face were severely burned. The two men on the face, the deputy and one of the stonemen subsequently succumbed to their injuries.
Coal dust played little or no part in the explosion along the roadway, but the flame must have travelled a considerable distance outbye as a piece of charred paper was found about 70 yards from the canch. There was definite coking on the face props for a distance of 60 yards towards the mothergate, and effects of the explosion extended beyond this point, for some men working near the face of the mothergate were slightly burned. No one appeared to have been affected by afterdamp.
The quantity of air circulating in the district was measured at various points as follows :—
| Main intake to 5th West district. (See Plate I) | 10,935 c.f.min. |
| Intake outside 19 cross heading. (See Plate I A.M.2) | 7,425 c.f.min. |
| Intake 100 yards from face of tailgate. (See Plate I A.M.3) | 2,952 c.f.min. |
| Return from 5th West district. (See Plate I A.M.4) | 8,112 c.f.min. |
Dust samples were collected and analysed with the following results :—
| Combustible Matter per cent. | Moisture per cent. | |
| Roof, floor and sides, 5 yds. radius of shot | 56.1 | 3.3 |
| Roof, 10-70 yds. from face of tailgate | 45.3 | 2.3 |
| Floor ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, | 45.2 | 2.9 |
| Sides ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, | 38.7 | 2.5 |
There was no evidence that the deceased deputy applied any stone dust before firing the shot; a good supply was available on No. 19 heading.
The safety lamps from the affected area and the magneto exploder and shotfiring cable used were tested at the Mines Department Testing Station, Sheffield, and as they were found in order they can be excluded as possible sources of the ignition. At the time of the accident the coal-cutting machine near the mothergate was not working, the current was not on at the conveyor and there were no cables along the tailgate. Samples of the explosive in use were found to be correct in composition and the detonators gave satisfactory results under test.
It was apparent that the shot had done its work properly, and an examination of the canch failed to disclose any open fissures. A portion of the stone at the back of the hole not dislodged by the shot showed that the hole had been bored in a soft parting running parallel with, and at a distance of 1ft. 2in. from the roof. It must be remembered that a considerable time elapsed between the withdrawal of the supports from underneath the canch and the firing of the shot, so that the canch may have sagged and formed an open fissure at this parting.
Prior to the accident firedamp had not been recorded on "D" face since September, 1927 (and then only due to a blockage in an airway), and the deputy on the preceding shift made three examinations there without detecting any. It is evident, however, that at the time the shot was fired a considerable quantity had accumulated in the vicinity of the canch, and in this connection it is worthy of note that on the day in question the barometer fell a complete inch between the hours of 6 a.m. and 4 p.m. Nine hours after the explosion there was still an accumulation of inflammable gas near the roof from the canch edge to a break in the roof some 22ft. outbye. (See Plate II) Air samples collected near the roof were found upon analysis to contain 50.95 per cent., and 38.12 per cent, of CH4 respectively.
I am unable to explain how the gas was ignited. The evidence is that the shot was properly stemmed with clay, and judging by the ground after the accident it appeared to have done its work in the usual way. The ground had a number of vertical and horizontal breaks and these may have given the explosive less work to do than was anticipated, with the result that the flame came into contact with the explosive mixture present. A possibility also to be considered is that firedamp under high pressure may have been ignited at a comparatively low temperature, assuming there was a distinct cavity at or near the shothole.
The vital importance of strictly observing the rules for shotfiring as laid down in the Explosives in Coal Mines Orders and the fact that permitted explosives are not flameless cannot be too strongly emphasised.
I would also like to call attention to the requirements of General Regulation 104 and to the importance of deputies carefully observing the barometer and recording the reading before going into the mine and at the completion of their shifts. I am not satisfied that this was done on the day of the accident.
After a lengthy hearing the Coroner's jury came to the conclusion that the deceased men died from shock and burns as a result of an ignition of gas by shotfiring. They further found that if a proper examination had been made by the deputy (Bell) the gas would have been discovered and that in firing a shot under the conditions which existed he was guilty of negligence.
| Source: | 1928 Mines Inspectors Report |
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| Fatalities | |
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Bell, Samuel, Deputy, explosion of firedamp | |
 | Hutton, John, aged 49, Stoneman, explosion of firedamp |
McKenna, Thomas, explosion of firedamp | |
Webster, John, explosion of firedamp | |
All names found | |
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