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Unfortunately the Division cannot claim the same immunity from fatal accidents due to explosions of fire-damp that I was able to report a year ago. Seven persons lost their lives from this cause. By far the most serious explosion, which resulted in the death of three persons and caused injury to a fourth, occurred about 8 a.m. on Tuesday, the 4th August, 1914, in the Lickbank Seam of the Clifton Colliery, near Workington. There was no indication at the surface that an explosion had taken place in this mine, and the discovery was made more or less casually by a surface foreman named Barnes, who went below ground at 9 a.m., at the request of the manager, to see what work the pump was doing. The seam itself may be called a gassy one, but the district affected was fortunately damp throughout. Dust, therefore, played no part in the explosion. The district had been opened out by a longwall step face, there being 20 gateways — 14 yards apart centre to centre — and the coal was worked to the rise. The amount of air usually ventilating the district was 5,000 cubic feet per minute. At the time of the accident only four men were underground in this seam, these men were doing some shift work and attending to a pump driven by a three-phase current motor at 500 volts. Three of the men were officials and the other was a pumpman. The last ordinary shift of miners finished on Friday afternoon. No one went into the face to make an inspection after Friday; there was, therefore, a serious breach of Section 64 (1) of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. The question of inspecting and reporting upon places temporarily stopped in a district in which men have to work had been discussed by the manager and his oflicials, but no definite instructions had been given by the manager. On the Monday night, the undermanager took upon himself, for the first time, the responsibility of making the inspection where the men were to work; and he admitted at the inquest held upon the bodies of the deceased men, that he only tested for gas in the pump-house and at the bottom of No. 3 gate, and, further, that he could not trust himself to see anything less than 2 per cent. of gas. On the Saturday the fan was stopped from 6.30 a.m. till 6.30 p.m. During that time, no doubt, a great deal of gas accumulated in the district. On Saturday also, the pump motor gave trouble and the assistant electrician went to repair it. He found that the pump would not start and the stator was leaking to earth. The water was rising in the pump-house. He put another motor in, and on the Monday this also broke down, and he then put in a new stator. This plant would be taken through the door leading into the pump-house which was situated between the intake and return airways. When this door was open the air would be short circuited, and practically no air would pass around the district. During the week-end the pump appears to have given a great deal of trouble, and there is little doubt that the separation door was open the greater part of the time. It will be seen from the plan that the pump-house was badly situated. If the separation door was open the air would be short circuited, and if it was shut there was nothing to prevent the return air from circulating around the pump-house. The roof of the pump-house was about a yard above the top of the door, so that it would be possible for gas to accumulate at the roof even if some air scaled through the door. At the time of the explosion, two officials, Smith and Wright, were at work apparently rail laying or lifting at the bottom of No. 3 gate. The pumpman was standing at the starter in the pump-house, and Sanderson, an official, who, fortunately, escaped fatal injuries, was manipulating the pump cocks. As to the cause of the explosion — everything in and around the pump-house seemed to indicate that the explosion originated inside that chamber, and all the evidence pointed to the starter as the actual point of ignition. In the first place, the pump-house door was blown outward off its hinges and was found in the position shown upon the plan. Some masonry from near the door posts was also blown into the level. Sanderson, on the other side of the pump, also fell outward. In the second place, the screw-plug in the bottom of the oil vessel of the starting switch was found to be quite loose — sufficiently loose to allow the escape of oil. The fact that it was a screw-plug removes any possibility that the plug was loosened by the explosion. The escape of oil would expose live contacts and cause open sparking in the operation of the switch, and would explode any oil vapour present in the switch case. The cast-iron case of the starting switch was found to be broken into many pieces, and these were found all around the original position of the switch — consistent only with an explosion within the body of the switch. Further, the actual switch resistance coiled around porcelain was found to be undamaged. The thin sheeting at the top of the case held down by screws at the corners was curved upwards with one end free, and it is significant that the face only of the pumpman was burnt. Sanderson, too, said that the flame appeared to come from the motor soon after starting the pump. Sanderson could not definitely say that the pump-house door was shut at the time of the explosion, but he thought it was. In any case, there would be some fresh air in the main level next to the pump-house, consequently the deceased men, Smith and Wright, would be working in fresh air which would scale up No. 3 gate. The flame from the starter would ignite the gas above it near the roof of the pumphouse. The explosion would follow the trail of gas along the return, probably gathering force until it reached the door D on the main level. Parts of this door were afterwards found towards the bottom of No. 3 gate. Here, fresh air would be met and the explosion developed its greatest force. A big fall occurred along this part of the level, and the two men were blown some distance up No. 3 gate ; portions of their clothing were found many yards up the gate. Their safety lamps were badly damaged. The force of the explosion spent itself along the level and up the gates. There were indications of flame and heat throughout the district. At the inquest, the manager said he had been unable to satisfy himself as to the cause of the explosion, but he thought it had originated in the gateway where Wright and Smith were working, probably from a damaged lamp or sparks from the rails when they were being moved. He found it difficult to account for the presence of an explosive mixture at that place at the time, and he also said that he had had every confidence in these officials. On account of the serious breach of Section 64 (1), and other minor irregularities in connection with the electrical plant, you ordered proceedings to be taken against the Agent, Manager, and Under-manager. The case was heard in the Workington Court on October 28th, 1914, when the defendants pleaded guilty. In spite of the fact that three men had lost their lives, and that an explosion had travelled around the whole of the seam in question, the magistrates considered that only a technical breach of the Act had been committed and they thought that the payment of costs would meet the case.
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