Disasters - Names		Disasters - Names

Date:	7th January 1904
Colliery:	St. Helen's No.3, Workington
Cause:	Explosion
Lives Lost:	2

St. Helen's Colliery Explosions.

On the 7th January, 1904, two explosions of fire-damp and air, causing together two deaths and injuries to 15 persons, occurred in the workings of the coal seam usually known as the Main Band, or where it splits into two seams as the Metal and Cannel Bands, of the No. 8 Pit, St. Helen's Colliery, owned by the St. Helen's Colliery and Brickworks Co., Ltd., and situated near the sea shore about a mile north of Workington in the County of Cumberland.

Five persons, including Mr. J. Morrison, the manager, were injured by the first explosion, which occurred at 3.15 p.m.; the second explosion at 8.30 p.m. was of a more serious character, and caused the death of two deputies named Joseph Atkinson and William Hoodless, and injury to ten other persons, including Mr. G. Scoular, the managing director of the company, Mr. J. Underwood, the undermanager (who had been in the district when the first explosion happened but had then escaped injury), Mr. T. P. Martin, the Secretary of the Cumberland Coal Association, and seven officials. In addition to these explosions, causing loss of life and injury, other explosions occurred the same day unattended by such results.

Both explosions occurred in the same district of the mine, and in both the means of ignition of the explosive mixture was the same, viz., the flame of a fire caused by the firing, by electric battery, of a shot in the coal charged with the permitted explosive stowite.

Flame from the shot ignited feeders of gas issuing from the coal, which in turn set fire to the coal, timber, &c.

Both explosions took place after all the miners had left the pit and while operations were being carried out for arresting the current of air circulating in the vicinity of the fire.

As no doubt exists in this case as to the immediate and proximate causes of the explosions, it is unnecessary to describe in much detail the general arrangements of the mine, which is an extensive establishment having other districts at work in the seam in which the explosions occurred as well as workings in other seams at both higher and lower levels.

The plan accompanying this report, Plate I, shows the district of the mine in which the explosions occurred, together with the roads connecting it with the shafts.

The shafts, two in number, are 28½ feet apart and cut the Main Band at 119 fathoms. Ventilation is produced by a Guibal fan on the surface placed near the top of the upcast shaft.

The explosions occurred in a district of longwall workings known as the North Fault district lying to the north-west of the shafts and partly beyond low water mark. These workings lay on the dip side of a dislocation of 27-feet throw through which were only two roads, an intake air way, also used as a horse haulage road, and a return air road. A third road across the dislocation, intended to act as a second return air road, was nearly completed at the time of the explosion, but was not actually connected with the workings on the dip side.

Contrary to the usual practice the intake air way for the North Fault district was only used as such and as a travelling way for about half its length from the downcast shaft, no coal being led over this portion of the road; the inner portion was both used as an intake air way and as the horse haulage road. The main return airway for the whole seam was also the main haulage road, and along it the laden tubs were drawn singly at a slow speed in the same direction as the air current by an endless rope.

The inner length of the intake air way into the North Fault district continued in a straight line outbye as a horse road to the main return and endless rope haulage road, and on this length of road there were two wooden doors and the circulation of air on it was limited to scales past the doors.

It was stated at the inquest that 20,000 cubic feet of air per minute passed into the North Fault district and divided into two currents near the face more than half the quantity passing round the left side workings, and this split passed under the intake by a natural air crossing on the inbye side of the 2 7 feet fault and joined the split passing round the right side workings, which latter was regulated by a regulator at the point marked R on the plan.

The current of air was kept up to the faces by wooden doors and canvas sheets as shown on the plan.

The section of the Main Band at the point where the shot was fired is as follows :—

	Ft.	ins.
Top coal	1	7	Metal Band	Main Band
Black stone	0	8	"	"
Coal	2	0	"	"
Metal and fireclay	8	0		"
Coal	1	6½	Cannel Band	"
Tom (black shale)	0	3½	"	"
Spar coal	0	10½	"	"
Cannel	0	6	"	"
Black stone	0	3½	"	"
Coal	1	1½	"	"
Fireclay holing.

The working faces in the North Fault district were dry but not specially dusty, and such coal dust as was present was largely mixed with stone dust due to the miners holing in the soft underclay of the seam. A similar condition prevailed on the horse road, where any coal dust present was mixed with stone dust from the pavement of the seam trampled up by the horses' feet. The main return and endless rope road was on the whole free from coal dust, although at one or two points deposits of fine coal dust were observed on its upper surfaces. The intake air way for some distance from the downcast shaft contained both on the floor and on its upper surfaces, and on the timber, sufficient fine coal dust to have carried forward an explosion once communicated to it. This dust was no doubt nearly altogether fine coal dust carried down the downcast shaft from the screens on the surface and conveyed so far inbye by the swift air current. The deposit of this fine coal dust gradually died out and did not extend into the district where the explosions occurred.

The workings in the North Fault district were almost wholly confined to the Cannel Band; the Metal Band being left for a second working. Fire-damp issues from the coal and adjacent strata in considerable quantity, and nothing but locked safety lamps are used in the workings.

The system of working in the North Fault district is longwall; the main roads are driven in the coal and pillars of coal are left to protect them, through which wide places are driven and then the longwall opened out as shown on the plan.

The shot that caused the fire was fired in the coal at the point marked "shot" on the plan. The hole was about 4 feet deep and was machine drilled. It started about 1 foot from the roof and was nearly level, It was stated that the coal was properly undercut and was loose at one side.

The shot firer, John Clark, stated that he charged the hole with three cartridges of stowite fitted with detonator and wires. The stemming was soft clay. On examining the place, before firing the shot, Clark stated that he found some gas present and he put up a canvas sheet to direct the air to it and also batted it with canvas; on testing again with his safety lamp he observed no indication of gas. He then (about 1.30 p.m.) retired some distance to the battery and fired the shot and saw a flash of fire as soon as it exploded. He waited a minute and then returned to the place and found gas burning. The gas, he stated, seemed to be coming out of the solid coal into the coal thrown by the shot, which was a successful one. He tried to bat out the flame with canvas, but failed to do so, and then went for the deputy, who returned with him to the place, and they both tried to extinguish the fire, but made no impression on it. The manager and back overman were sent for, but when they arrived it was not possible to approach the fire owing to the smoke backing against the air. It was then determined by the manager to cut off the air current from the left side faces by putting canvas stoppings in the intake beyond the point where the air split and in the return near the air crossing, and while preparations were being made for this-but before any stopping had actually been erected-the first explosion took place, injuring several of those engaged, including the manager, who was taken home and took no further part in the operations. All the persons engaged at this time got safely out.

After those injured by the first explosion were taken to the surface, there was a cessation of operations until the arrival, at 5 p.m., of Mr. G. Scoular, the managing director, who was accompanied by his son, Mr. A. C. Scoular, the surveyor of the colliery.

Several colliery managers and other gentlemen connected with mining in the district also came forward from time to time to render what help they could, including Mr. Jas. Gilchrist and Mr. J. W. Steele, of the Allerdale Coal Co. ; Mr. W. H. Ball, of the Flimby Collieries; Mr. R. W. Moore and Mr. B. Cowie, Lord Lonsdale's mineral agents; and Mr. T. P. Martin, the secretary of the Cumberland Coal Association.

A small party, accompanied by Mr. G. Scoular, went underground about 5.30 p.m. and travelled so far inbye by the return air way and were not much inconvenienced by smoke, but came to the conclusion that they were too few in numbers and returned to the surface. Soon after, about 6.30 p.m., a larger party, numbering about 25 persons, headed by Mr. G. Scoular, went underground and penetrated to within 40 yards of the fire. No positive evidence of the active existence of a fire could be observed; there was less smoke and the presence of fire-damp at certain points led them to conclude that the fire had probably died out, and it was agreed to again attempt to arrest the air current circulating round the left side workings in case any smouldering matter might be fanned into active fire.

The first explosion had no doubt disarranged to some extent the doors and sheets, and it was found to be necessary to close up four roads on the left side as well as the return air way. The members of the party separated themselves for this purpose and were busy at the various points when the second explosion took place at 8.30 p.m., about three-quarters of an hour after the erection of the stoppings was begun and when the air was nearly altogether cut off from the left side workings. Mr. W .H. Ball and two deputies were at the inbye stopping and were knocked over by the blast and lost their lights, but managed to scramble out. Joseph Atkinson, who lost his life, was engaged at the stopping in the return air way, and here the force of the explosion was probably greatest. William Hoodless was working at some intermediate point, and after the explosion he appears to have taken the wrong road as he was not seen afterwards, and his body was eventually recovered at a point marked "C" on the plan. Those who were not seriously injured, assisted by Mr. A. C. Scoular, Mr. Hodgkiss, undermanager of another pit owned by the company, Mr. Cowie, and others, who were coming inbye when the second explosion happened, assisted the injured members of the party outbye as well as carrying out the body of Joseph Atkinson. In the confusion it was not at first noticed that William Hoodless was not with them. When so far outbye, a third explosion took place about 9.50 p.m. It extinguished some of the lights, but did not injure anyone.

A telegram, informing me of a "serious fire" in the mine, was received by me about 4.30 p.m., and I left Newcastle by the first available train, arriving at the colliery about 10.30 p.m., when I found nearly all the officials hors de combat and operations suspended until my arrival. After an examination of the plan and making myself generally acquainted with the position of affairs, the question of the recovery of William Hoodless, who it was then known was left in the mine, was discussed, and it was decided not to attempt it as there was great risk of a further explosion. It was proposed to isolate the district, including other districts of the seam, by building stoppings near the shafts, and accompanied by several others I descended the shaft to fix upon suitable sites for the stoppings and also to examine the roads leading to the shafts so as to form a judgment as to whether they contained sufficient coal dust to extend to the shafts a gas explosion at the face, as when I was Assistant Inspector in the district I knew that an explosion on 19th April, 1888, had been so extended in the same seam of this mine and caused the loss of 30 lives.

The circumstances in the present case were not so favourable for the deposition of coal dust on the roads as they were in the explosion of 1888, as in that case the trains of tubs were drawn at a high speed against the air current on the intake airway. The conditions as to coal dust, I observed, together with the fact that three explosions of gas had actually occurred in the North Fault district without being extended, led me to conclude that there would be no great danger in erecting the stoppings near the shafts, and their building was at once decided on and begun, the 17 horses and ponies being drawn as the work proceeded.

I remained at the colliery all night, descending the shaft at intervals to inspect the stoppings, which were completed at about 10.30 a.m., when all persons left the mine. While the stoppings were being built, smoke from the fire came out on the haulage and return air road, and it was stated that some disturbance of the air was noticed about 4.30 a.m., as though another explosion had taken place in the workings.

The stoppings were built of bricks and slag lime at the points near the shafts marked S = S on the plan. They were 2 feet 3 inches thick. They were buttressed on the following day, and on the 11th, on the advice of Mr. T. E. Forster, mining engineer, of Newcastle, 6 feet of sand, held in position by an 18-inch brick wall, was placed before the two principal stoppings, those in the intake and return air roads from the North Fault district. The stoppings were examined from time to time and pointed where shrinkage was observed. They were finally removed on 31st March, or about three months after they were erected. The return stopping was first removed and then the intake stoppings. Large volumes of gas came off, but on the 2nd April it was possible to get into the North Fault district, when the body of William Hoodless was found, and on the 4th April I made an inspection. The actual site of the fire could not then be reached, but all the evidence pointed to its being absolutely extinguished.

The district was gradually re-opened, and inspection then showed that the fire had crept along the face with the air for over 70 yards in the coal, and timber within 3 or 4 feet of the face had also been on fire. In one gateway the woodwork of a tub was nearly consumed. Against the air no evidences of fire were observed.

No coked coal dust was observed.

The mechanical effect of the explosions was not great. Wood doors or canvas sheets used for ventilating purposes were jammed or disarranged, and tubs were blown about; some of the roof timber on the main road had been displaced.

An inquest was held on the body of Joseph Atkinson and a verdict of accidental death returned. When the body of William Hoodless was recovered another inquest was held and a similar verdict returned.

I think the shot firer showed want of caution in firing the shot immediately after finding gas in the place. After the fire was established considerable risk of an explosion existed, but so long as the air was not cut off any explosion of gas and air was not likely to be very violent, and although the district was dry there was not sufficient coal dust to add to the danger. After the air was cut off, if the fire was still burning, there was great probability of a smart explosion. The prudence of the operations carried out under the directions of Mr. G. Scoular depended on the somewhat doubtful assumption that the fire was extinguished. Mr. G. Scoular is an acting certificated manager and a mining engineer of considerable eminence, and he was fortified by the advice and acquiescence of other mining experts, and that they did not think undue risk was being run is proved by the fact that they remained in the vicinity of the fire while the stoppings were being erected. The desire to isolate as small a district of the pit as possible was a natural one, and in dealing with underground fires in fiery mines it is almost impossible to avoid running some risk, but 1 must say that it seemed to me a somewhat improbable assumption that the fire was extinguished.

Source:

1904 Mines Inspectors Report (Cd 2506)

	Atkinson, Joseph, aged 55, Deputy, explosion
	Hoodless, William, aged 50, Deputy, explosion
	All names found

08 Jan 1904

Fatal Colliery Explosion (The Times)

 

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