17^th February 1911

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The Whitehaven Pit Disaster

Home Office Criticism

The report of Mr. R. A. S. Redmayne, Chief Inspector of Mines, and Mr. Samuel Pope, barrister, on the causes and circumstances of the disaster at the Wellington Pit, Whitehaven Colliery, on May 11, was issued yesterday as a Blue-book [Cd. 5524]. The disaster resulted in the loss of 136 lives. Mr. Redmayne's inquiry on behalf of the Home Office was held concurrently with the coroner's inquest, and Mr. Pope attended as the legal representative of the Home Secretary.

The jury of 18 unanimously found (as was recorded in The Times of December 3) that the men were killed as the result of an explosion or explosions caused by the ignition of gas and coal-dust combined, but that there was not sufficient evidence to show whether or not a defective safety lamp was responsible.

Mr. Redmayne's Conclusions.

Mr. Redmayne, after a long description of the colliery and the systems of working and ventilation, gives a narrative of the disaster and the attempted rescue operations, describes the stopping and reopening of the pit and the exploration work, discusses the originating point and cause of the explosion, and arrives at a number of conclusions and recommendations.

He says he is perfectly satisfied that the explosion originated near the working face up the No. 1 brake of the third North district, that it was initiated by the ignition of firedamp, and that the explosion was carried on by means of coal-dust. There is every probability that it is attributable to a safety lamp, which may have been either in perfect or defective condition.

No precautions seem to have been taken in case of the "weighting" of the goaf — a feature which presages a fall of roof, and which, with such a roof as that in question, would be an incident fraught with very great danger to those in the neighbourhood of the goaf. In similar circumstances the men in the neighbourhood should be cautioned and told to withdraw in the event of pronounced "weighting," and I would suggest that it is most desirable that those working in the neighbourhood of similar goaves (i.e., goaves where the roof consists of a thick bed of hard rock which does not readily fall or bend) should be provided with electric lamps in place of oil safety lamps.

Failure Of The Rescue Operations.

Dealing with the rescue operations, Mr. Redmayne says they were properly and most energetically carried on at very great risk to the lives of those taking part. He adds :—

I consider it most unfortunate that Henry (the under manager) was accompanied in bye by so few helpers, and that so much time was lost on the way in bye — chiefly, it must in fairness be said to the efforts made, happily successful, in restoring Walker and Gregory (with whom they spent 55 minutes) at Benk's Turn. Had he and his fellow-rescuers proceeded straight in bye I believe that the incipient fire at the "friction-gear" would have been successfully combated and the whole of the men in the 5th and 6th North rescued.

The Inspector proceeds :—

The almost total failure of the rescue operations constitutes a convincing argument in favour of the provision at every colliery of trained rescue brigades and means of summoning them at short notice. The summoning could easily be effected by some form of agreed upon signal, such as blowing the colliery steam whistle ("horn," "hooter," or "buzzer") a certain number of times or continuously until sufficient help arrived.

Had there been a second main intake air road into the mine, at a sufficient distance from the main haulage road, this road would in all probability have been available as a means of access to the entombed miners. The Back South Dip was too near to the main haulage road to serve this purpose. At some large collieries a separate intake road is provided as a travelling road, and is a wise provision.

Haphazard Precautions.

The precautions against the accumulation of coal-dust were of a haphazard and unsystematic character. . . . Had the haulage road of the 3rd North been systematically cleared of dust and damped with water the explosive blast would not have traversed this road — at any rate to the extent it did — and so would not have reached the "friction gear." . . . Unless the grave danger which exists at many collieries owing to the presence of coal-dust is attacked with much greater earnestness in future than it has been in the past, disasters of a similar character will occur from time to time. Had water mains been in use along the main road — as should be the case in all dry and dusty mines in those cases where watering does not disastrously affect the floor — there is great probability that the spread of the conflagration might have been prevented — even when Henry reached the scene of disaster — and the fire ultimately extinguished. Wear and Kenmare could certainly have extinguished when they came past it had water been available in this manner, but the probability is that the explosive force at the "friction-gear" would have sufficed to have broken the pipes and prevented the initiation of the fire.

Inadequate Ventilation.

As to ventilation the Inspector says :—

I am of the opinion that the ventilation of the working face was inadequate for the needs of the mine, having in view the gassy nature of the coal. I think that this inadequacy was largely due to the excessive leakage from the air current in its course from the shaft to the working face, and not to any want of ventilating power at the surface, any increase of which would not have materially affected the face ventilation. Further, that this leakage was due to errors on the part of a former management, and that the present management had made considerable efforts to improve matters, which efforts were being continued at the time of the explosion. This inadequacy cannot in my view, therefore, be wholly attributed to the existing management. Nevertheless the system of ventilating the 5th North district with 6th North air was an instance of bad mining practice and pointed to a want of proper appreciation of the dangers attendant on such a practice.

Mr. Redmayne says that it is difficult to state the bearing or otherwise of the inadequacy of the ventilation on the occurrence of the explosion, but gas was bound to collect in such a "goaf" unless the waste or "goaf" was swept by a sufficient ventilating current or drained by "ascentional ventilation," and, when the roof fell, to be driven out with great force on to those working the coal in the neighbourhood.

Searching Men For Matches.

Mr. Redmayne considers that in view of the dangerous nature of mining, and the liability to ignitions of gas and coal dust, it should be made compulsory on the part of the management to search all persons entering such a mine for matches. He adds :—

In Scotland the manager is empowered by special rule to search persons "when and as often as he may think proper," but here the search is voluntary on the part of the management. In Cumberland the search is to be made only "if there be any grounds for suspicion." In Yorkshire and Lincolnshire "men may be searched for tobacco, pipes, and matches, but the person making such search shall be first examined by two of the workmen of the mine." In North and East Lancashire, "if there be any ground for suspicion, he shall be subject to be personally searched," and so on, in several other of the districts. In no case is compulsory searching enacted. . . . It is desirable that at mines where safety lamps are in use a record should be kept daily at the mine specifying the number of lamp which is out, the name of the person to whom it has been delivered, when delivered, and when returned, and any injury it has received during use.

Mr. Pope's Criticism.

Mr. Pope in his report states that the most important aspect of the evidence was the proof of laxity in the matter of organization. To this are no doubt traceable :—

(1) The apparent absence of strict discipline in the mine.

(2) The apparent lack of any uniform line of action to be followed by each and every overman and deputy throughout the pit in cases where fire-damp gave indications of its presence in the working places or elsewhere.

(3) The apparent wide discretion and responsibility given to, or assumed by, the overmen and deputies, particularly with reference to reporting gas.

(4) The keeping of reports in a manner not calculated to present to the management the real condition of the pit, in every part, at any moment.

While recording matters in which he considers that there have been breaches of specific statutory duty, Mr. Pope does not think it was in any way established that there was any connexion between the fact of the explosion and these departures from the rules. He says :—

In my opinion there is only one possible charge of negligence causing death which could be suggested. It is that the insufficient watering of the mine (it being of a dry and dusty nature in the districts principally affected by the explosion) enabled the originating explosion to travel over and devastate a large area in the form of a coal-dust explosion, and so brought about the deaths of men in parts of the mine well removed from the point of origin. The evidence showed that some watering was done, but that the system was inadequate to prevent an explosion travelling over the mine. However, no statutory provisions have been made regulating the clearing of dust from the roads or requiring the main travelling roads in the mine, generally, to be efficiently watered, or otherwise treated for the purpose of removing the danger arising from the presence of fine dry coal-dust, nor has science yet determined what is the right, or even the most effective, remedy to adopt under the varying circumstances found in daily practice. For these and other reasons I am clearly of opinion that there is no case made out, or which could be made out, sufficiently strong to justify criminal proceedings.